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Abstract
L. Nahuelhual, M.A. Engler, B. Carrillo, V. Moreira, and I. Castro. 2009. Adoption of 
cleaner production practices by dairy farmers in southern Chile. Cien. Inv. Agr. 36(1):97-
106. Rising concerns about the environmental costs of dairy production have resulted in an 
increasing use of farm practices that diminish negative production externalities. Yet, little 
empirical evidence exists regarding the factors infl uencing the adoption of pollution-reducing 
strategies by dairy farmers. In this study, we estimate a logit probability model to explain fi rst-
stage adoption of capital-intensive cleaner production (CP) practices, using a sample of 100 
medium and large-size dairy farms located in southern Chile. Voluntary approaches to pollution 
control in agriculture are relatively recent in Chile and diffusion has been slow and uneven 
among farmers. Only 43% of the farmers surveyed were using some CP practices at the time of 
the interview. The probability of adoption was found to be positively correlated with farmer’s 
education and age, awareness of environmental regulations, the type of milk buyer, and the 
use of complementary CP management practices. Conversely, farm structure variables were 
not signifi cant, which suggests that the adoption of CP practices could be responding to non-
economic motivations. 
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Introduction 
Rising awareness and concern about the envi-
ronmental costs of agricultural production have 
stimulated new interest in increasing the use of 
farm practices that diminish negative externali-
ties (Fuglie and Kascak, 2001). In turn, social 
pressures demanding the improvement of en-
vironmental performance and product quality 
have contributed to the growing development of 
environmental standards and regulations (Hicks 
and Dietmar, 2007).
Regulatory agencies, environmental groups, 
and concerned citizens have focused their atten-
tion on livestock operations and, more specifi -
cally, on wastewater and manure-related pollu-
tion problems resulting from large and intensive 
farm units. Dairy operations in particular are 
critical in regard to the high organic matter and 
nutrient levels contained in dairy effl uents that 
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can have detrimental effects on drinking water 
supplies, fi sh resources, and recreation (Rahe-
lizatovo, 2002).  
Different policy instruments for achieving en-
vironmental goals have been developed, which 
range from moral persuasion, command and 
control regulations by government, to eco-
nomic incentives and voluntary strategies by 
private fi rms (Rahelizatovo, 2002). Among the 
latter, cleaner production (CP) is considered to 
be a strategy addressing the generation of pol-
lution as well as the effi cient use of resources 
at all stages of the production process (Hicks 
and Dietmar, 2007). Under a CP approach to 
environmental regulation, the government au-
thority calls attention to the potential damage 
caused by pollution and facilitates voluntary 
actions by fi rms and their associations to ad-
dress that harm. Voluntary strategies like this 
are intended to create win-win situations, where 
the regulator achieves the desired environmen-
tal target with decreased enforcement costs and 
the regulated entities meet that target with more 
fl exibility and effi ciency (Woods et al., 2006; 
Daley, 2007). 
In the context of dairy farming in Chile, CP 
involves the following management aspects 
contained in the CP public-private agreement 
proposal that is under negotiation: manure 
handling (extraction, storage, and application), 
disposal of waste waters (from milk-houses and 
sanitary installations), removal and storage of 
solid waste including veterinary products, use 
of good-quality water sources, odor manage-
ment, workers’ hygiene and security, and en-
ergy effi ciency (CPL, 2006; Hollstein, personal 
communication, 2007). Hence, the successful 
implementation of CP plans involves a series 
of management practices and technologies that 
represent a signifi cant investment and decrease 
in operational costs to farmers. In Chile, as well 
as in other countries, voluntary approaches to 
pollution control are relatively recent and the 
implementation of CP practices by dairy farm-
ers has been slow. It can be observed, however, 
that a few of the farmers have started to incor-
porate some of the proposed practices. 
In 2007, Chile had 495,465 milking cows (INE, 
2007), 19.5% less than in 1997. In turn, milk 
output rose from 890 million liters in 1990 to 
1,871 million liters in 2007 with 69.4% (1,299 
million liters) concentrated in the Los Ríos and 
Los Lagos regions in southern Chile (ODEPA, 
2000, 2006, and 2008). Simultaneously to the 
rapid growth and intensifi cation of the Chil-
ean dairy sector, the increased loads of organic 
waste onto pasture lands has resulted in greater 
environmental impacts that affect on-site soil 
quality and water sources (Alfaro and Salazar, 
2005). Historic over-application of phosphorous 
and nitrogen through commercial fertilizers and 
organic wastes has contributed to the potential 
for off-site impacts by surface runoff and by 
subsurface transport (Alfaro and Salazar, 2005). 
Despite these well recognized environmental 
externalities, dairy farming in Chile has been 
mostly immune to environmental regulation. At 
present there are no specifi c policies or instru-
ments (mandatory or non-mandatory) aimed at 
inducing environmental compliance by dairy 
operations. 
Attending to the broad goal of more sustainable 
agricultural development, in 2001 the Cleaner 
Production Policy was enacted. Under this pol-
icy, the Chilean government authority aims at 
promoting self-regulation by fi rms to address 
pollution reductions. The main instrument of 
this policy is the “cleaner production agree-
ment” (CPA), which engages public and private 
agents that are linked to a specifi c productive 
sector with the goal of creating incentives re-
quired by private fi rms and industries to com-
ply with existing regulations (i.e., water quality 
standards) (CPL, 2006). Like other negotiated 
agreements, a CPA is legally not-binding. Par-
ticipating fi rms have to prepare, in collaboration 
with public agencies and other stakeholders, 
plans for pollution abatement while the govern-
ment commits to abstaining from introducing 
new legislation (e.g., standards or taxes) unless 
the voluntary action fails to meet the agreed 
upon environmental goal (Khanna, 2001). 
Government monitoring of these CPAs in some 
industrial sectors shows positive environmental 
and economic impacts resulting from the more 
effi cient use of resources (i.e., water, energy, 
and other inputs) in the productive processes, 
improved productivity, and reduced input losses 
and equipment failures, which in turn are pos-
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sible through technology innovation and adap-
tation (CPL, 2006; Jiménez, 2007). Regarding 
agriculture on a broad scale, some sectors such 
as fruit and beef exporters and cheese and dairy 
processors have been very actively involved in 
the CPA since 2001. However, the dairy farm 
sector has not advanced at the same pace. Al-
though the main dairy farmer organizations 
have stated that a CPA could become a differ-
entiating attribute of their milk, also improv-
ing their competitiveness, they still have not 
reached a consensus with regulators and other 
stakeholders on how to successfully achieve en-
vironmental goals. 
The goal of this study was to examine the factors 
affecting the joint adoption of fi ve capital-inten-
sive CP practices by a sample of 100 dairy farms 
located in the Los Ríos (39º 30´ - 41º 00 S and 73º 
5´W) and Los Lagos regions (41º 00´ - 44º 00 S 
and 72.56º W). Specifi cally, we estimated a bi-
nary logit probability model containing elements 
from the adoption/diffusion and farm structure 
theories to explain the actual use of CP practices 
by dairy farmers in southern Chile. 
Materials and methods
Sample and data collection
The data came from an on-site survey of a 100 
farmers in 2005. Farms were classifi ed into me-
dium (100 thousand to one million liters of milk 
per year) and large-size farms (>one million 
L·year-1 of milk) according to the stratifi cation 
proposed by Smith et al. (2002), with 25% of the 
sample classifi ed as medium farms and 75% as 
large. In 2005, these 100 farms produced 14.3% 
of the total milk volume sold to the industry in 
the Los Ríos and Los Lagos regions. The data 
collected through the survey instrument includ-
ed a range of questions related to the use of CP 
and Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) as well 
as farm structure variables and farmers’ attri-
butes. The selection of questions regarding the 
use of CP practices was based on various envi-
ronmental protocols established by the national 
health and agriculture authorities (i.e., CPA and 
GAP protocols), the Codex Alimentarius, the 
United States Food and Drug Administration 
(USDA) standards for grade “A” raw milk, and 
the EUREPGAP protocol (GAP framework of 
the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, EU-
REP) (Carrillo, 2006). 
Considering that CP is a voluntary strategy 
and that the CPA is not yet agreed upon, many 
practices included in the questionnaire were not 
implemented at the time of the interview and 
were therefore excluded from the analysis. As 
a result, only fi ve capital-intensive CP practices 
were selected to represent fi rst-stage adoption 
of a CP program by a typical dairy farm, includ-
ing: a) presence of a manure storage structure 
adequately designed and managed to contain 
manure, wastewater, contaminated runoff, and 
manure mixed with litter or bedding without 
any discharge to superfi cial or underground wa-
ters; b) use of a fresh water supply source for the 
milk-house and related installations, properly 
sanitized and isolated; c) presence of adequate 
sanitary installations for farm operators; d) use 
of an adequate system of disposal for the milk-
house waste waters. Milk-house waste waters 
contain the remainder of manure deposited in 
the milking parlor, udder washings, and equip-
ment wash-water containing milk, detergents, 
acids and chlorine. These waters should be 
pumped to a properly designed liquid manure 
storage or stored in a separate storage system 
(concrete or earthen storage), and; e) use of an 
adequate system of disposal of waste waters 
from sanitary installations. 
The farmers in the sample were considered to 
be users (adopters) of capital-intense CP prac-
tices if, at the time of the interview, they had 
implemented at least three of the aforemen-
tioned practices. All dairy farmers can not af-
ford capital-intense practices because of their 
high startup costs. In 2005 none of the farms in 
the sample had implemented all fi ve of the CP 
practices. 
Empirical framework and econometric 
techniques
Qualitative response models, strongly linked 
to utility theory, aim at relating the conditional 
probability of a particular choice to various at-
CIENCIA E INVESTIGACIÓN AGRARIA100
tributes of the alternatives, which are specifi c 
to each individual. These models are widely 
used in economic studies to investigate factors 
affecting an individual’s choices from two or 
more alternatives (McFadden, 1974; Ameniya, 
1981; Greener, 2000).
 
In the case of technology adoption, it is assumed 
that farmers make their decisions by choosing 
the alternative that maximizes their perceived 
utility. A farmer is likely to adopt a new tech-
nology or practice if the utility of adopting (Ui1) 
is larger than the utility of not doing so (Ui0); 
that is if U*i= Ui1-Ui0>0. Since utility is not di-
rectly observed by the researcher, it needs to be 
approached by an observed binary random vari-
able (Maddala, 1992).
Defi ning a qualitative variable for the adoption 
of the new practice Ii, we have that Ii=1 if the 
farmer adopts and zero otherwise. The prob-
ability of adoption is given by the expression
P1 = P (Ii = 1) = P (U
*
i > 0) = P(Vi1 −Vi0 >εi0−εi1)
where Vi  is to the systematic component of util-
ity related to the probability of adopting and the 
term (εi0−εi1 ) is a random distribution term. As-
suming that the stochastic elements of utility εi0  
and εi1  are independently and identically dis-
tributed with a Weibull distribution, their dif-
ference follows a logistic distribution (Maddala, 
1992). If utility is given by a linear function and 
if choice probabilities depend only on observed 
individual-specifi c characteristics (Judge et al., 
1995), the relative odds of adopting are given by 
the expression
(P1/(1− P1)) = exp(Σ βi Xi)
Taking the natural logarithm of each side, the 
resulting logit model can be represented by the 
expression
ln[(P1 /(1− P )] =Σβ1 X1
where the probability (P1 ) that a farmer adopts 
the practices occurs for an observed set of 
covariates and the β1’s are the coeffi cients to be 
estimated.
The fi nal specifi cation of the logit model is giv-
en in equation 1:
ln[(P1/(1− P1)]=β0 +β1Age+β2Edu+β3Exp+β4Vcow+β5Coop+β6Mnf+β7Mi+β8Reg,
(1)
where Age is the farmer’s age, Edu is his/her 
level of education, Exp is his/her experience as 
a dairy farmer (all measured in years), Vcow is 
a measure of dairy productivity expressed in an-
nual milk production per cow, Coop is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the farmer sells the milk 
to a dairy Cooperative, which, at the time of the 
survey, was the largest dairy products manufac-
turer within the study area (Fuller et al., 2006), 
and Mnf is a binary variable that equals 1 if the 
farmer sells the milk to a cheese manufacturer 
and 0 otherwise. Cheese processors other than 
the Cooperative are the second most important 
milk manufactures for our sample. Mi is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if the farmer has adopted 
various management-intensive CP practices. 
These are considered less expensive than capital-
intense practices but their implementation re-
quires higher levels of human capital by farmers. 
Examples are the use of an adequate system for 
disposal of garbage and hazardous waste, the use 
of a safe method for storage and removal of pes-
ticide containers, the existence of a pest manage-
ment plan, and the existence of an environmental 
risk management plan. Finally, Reg is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the farmer is aware of en-
vironmental regulations affecting dairy farming 
(mainly CP policy and GAP) and 0 otherwise.
 
The effect of any independent variable on the 
probability of adoption is not given by the mag-
nitude of the βi’s but by the marginal effects, 
which account for the partial change in the prob-
ability of an event (Sheikh et al., 2003). The 
marginal effects were obtained by taking the 
partial derivative of the expression of the prob-
ability with respect to a change in the variable 
of interest. The most commonly chosen refer-
ence point for calculating marginal effects is the 
mean of the variables. However, this approach 
is inappropriate if the matrix of covariates in-
cludes dummy variables (i.e., the mean value for 
a dummy variable does not correspond to any 
observable value). The correct approach in this 
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case is to estimate the marginal effects at spe-
cifi c values of the dummy variable while hold-
ing continuous variables at their means. In this 
study, dummy variables with means less than 0.5 
were set at 0 and dummy variables with means 
greater than 0.5 were set at 1.
We used the correct classifi cation of cases 
(adopters and non-adopters) as goodness of fi t 
measures, which involves the number of cases 
assigned correctly and incorrectly on the ba-
sis of the probability of occurrence of an event 
(Sheikh et al., 2003; Mishra and Goodwin, 
2006) and the McFadden R2, calculated as
R2 McF = 1− (ln u / r),
where u is the unrestricted log-likelihood 
function and r is the restricted log likelihood 
function (McFadden, 1974). The model was 
estimated using the maximum likelihood tech-
nique available within the LIMDEP 7.0 statisti-
cal package. 
Results and discussion
Characteristics of dairy farmers and farming 
systems
Adopters of CP capital-intensive practices man-
aged a larger number of milking and total cows. 
They also had larger farms and better produc-
tivity than non-users with a daily production per 
cow of fi ve liters higher, which is a relevant dif-
ference in a dairy system. A higher percent of 
adopters also used other technologies and prac-
tices such as feedlots and management-intense 
CP practices.
Few farmers held an Animal Operations under 
Offi cial Certifi cation (AOOC) probably due to 
the fact that Chile just became a net exporter of 
dairy products in 2001. The AOOC is manda-
tory for farmers producing export-quality milk 
(Table 1).
On average, adopters were older and more edu-
cated, whereas both groups exhibited a similar 
experience as dairy producers. In both groups 
the percentage of farmers aware of the existence 
of environmental regulations affecting dairy 
farming did not reach half of the sample, being 
higher in the users group. This fi nding is rele-
vant for regulatory institutions and policy mak-
ers, refl ecting that information is not always 
correctly and accurately transferred, especially 
when it is coming from different sources such as 
the GAP, domestic and international standards, 
and CP policy, among others. 
Model estimation results
The model correctly predicted and classifi ed 
81% of the farmers. The McFadden R2  was 0.11, 
which, along with the percentage of correct pre-
dictions, indicates that the model has reasonably 
good explanatory power. 
The variable Age had a positive and signifi cant 
coeffi cient, suggesting that older farmers are po-
tentially more aware and concerned about pol-
lution damage arising from dairy farming, thus 
increasing the probability of adopting CP prac-
tices. Yet, its impact on the probability was low, 
as indicated by the marginal effect coeffi cient 
(0.015). Edu was also positive and signifi cant, 
which is consistent with the adoption/diffusion 
theory, where innovators are better educated 
than late adopters (Padel, 2001). Its marginal 
effect coeffi cient indicates that an additional 
year of formal schooling raises the probability 
of adoption by 10%. On the contrary, the coef-
fi cient on Exp did not infl uence the probability 
of adoption (Table 2). 
Milk productivity (Vcow) is used here as a farm 
structural factor. This variable, contrary to our 
expectations, was statistically not signifi cant 
suggesting that productivity does not neces-
sarily infl uence the probability of adoption. We 
tried other structural factors such as farm size, 
but they were not signifi cant, suggesting that 
adoption of capital-intense CP practices may be 
related to non-economic factors. Burton et al. 
(1997) found non-economic factors to be widely 
present in the decision of farmers to change to 
organic systems, which may refl ect the impor-
tance of life-style related goals to organic grow-
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Table 1. Characteristics of dairy operations and farmers. 





Farmers, no. 43 57
Average of total cows, no. 373 251
Average of milking cows, no. 310 216
Average milk production per cow, L·day-1 23.5 17.8
Milking/total cows ratio 0.83 0.86
Total farm area, ha 222.9 189.5
Existence of other dairy management practices and technologies % %
AOOC2 16.3 8.8
Feedlot 81.4 70.2
Management-intensive CP practices 51.2 22.8
Farmers characteristics
Average age, years 60.3 53.1
Average formal education, years 15.5 14.7
Average experience as dairy farmer, years 8.5 8.4
Awareness of environmental regulations by farmers 39.5 38.6
1CP = Cleaner production
2AOOC (Animal operations under offi cial certifi cation) is an export certifi cation system developed by the Chilean Gov-
ernment with the main goal of guaranteeing the quality of the raw milk used by milk factories in the production of dairy 
products that are exported.
ers. Experiences with a diverse set of voluntary 
environmental programs show that some fi rms 
are motivated to act out of a combination of civic 
duty, good public relations, market differentiation 
and a apprehension for more stringent govern-
ment regulation, which is contrary to the image 
of profi t-seeking fi rms that pay no attention to the 
external impacts of their operation (May, 2005). 
Selling to a Cooperative (Coop) was an impor-
tant factor in explaining the probability of be-
ing a CP user with a marginal effect of 0.33. For 
many years this institution has formed alliances 
among cooperatives and dairy farmers in Chile, 
which has given it great market strength in the 
southern part of the country (Fuller et al., 2006). 
Moreover, producers in the southern regions 
have a very favorable opinion of the Coopera-
tive, in part because of its history in southern 
Chile but also because of the perception that the 
milk prices and assistance offered are superior 
to those offered by other fi rms (Fuller et al., 
2006). Selling to cheese manufacturers also had 
a positive infl uence on adoption, as indicated by 
the positive and signifi cant parameter on Mnf 
and a marginal effect of 0.55. It is important 
to remark that in Chile dairy processors do not 
provide explicit price incentives to farmers for 
adopting environmentally friendly practices. 
Yet, the Cooperative is investing more than the 
average industry in incorporating safety and en-
vironmental standards into its production pro-
cesses, which is used as a competitive strategy. 
Therefore, it is likely that the Cooperative buys 
milk from producers that follow stricter stan-
dards in order to keep value along the chain. 
This strategy could motivate farmers to adopt 
CP practices in order to continue selling to the 
Cooperative in the long run. 
As expected, the use of complementary man-
agement-intensive CP practices (Mi) was posi-
tive and statistically signifi cant, increasing the 
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Table 2. Logit model parameters and goodness of fi t measures.
Variable Parameter estimates1 Change in probability
Constant -15.05***      (4.39) -3.68
Age 0.62E-01*       (0.32E-01) 0.15E-01
Edu 0.43**             (0.19) 0.10
Exp -0.78E-01        (0.56E-01) -0.19E-01
Vcow 0.20E-03         (0.12E-03) 0.49E-04
Coop 3.63***           (1.23) 0.33
Mnf 2.85**             (1.17)       0.55
Mi 1.39**             (0.69)        0.33
Reg 2.19**             (0.95) 0.48
Unrestricted log likelihood -34.92     
Restricted log likelihood     -54.44     




Observed Non-adoption Adoption Predictions, %
Non-adoption 37 6 86.04
Adoption  9 27 75.00
Overall 81.01
1Standard error between brackets, and asterisks: * = p<0.1; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01, **** p<0.0001.  
221 observations were lost in the estimation due to item non-response problems.
probability of being a user of capital-intensive 
practices by 33%. Although a low percentage 
of farmers knew the environmental regulations 
(Table 1), the coeffi cient on Reg was positive 
and signifi cant, increasing the probability of us-
ing CP practices by 48%.
It is important to highlight that the adoption of 
CP practices under voluntary regulation differs 
in many respects from other innovations that 
have been the focus of early adoption studies. 
These differences have been highlighted by 
Padel (2001) for the case of organic farming 
adoption. First, CP (alike to organic farming) 
is a complex innovation that requires a system-
wide change on the part of the farmer. Pollution 
prevention requires structural investment that 
involves changing the operation and improv-
ing the environmental performance of the fi -
nal product throughout the production process 
(Gavronski et al., 2008), which is why innova-
tion can be seriously constrained by fi nancial 
capacity. In our sample, users of capital-intense 
CP practices coincide with farmers that hold 
larger farms and herds (Table 1). 
Secondly, although pollution prevention can 
generate signifi cant economic benefi ts in the 
form of reduced losses from excessive materials 
and energy consumed, such gains are usually 
not so obvious to the farmer. The recognition of 
these benefi ts will depend on the farm manager 
treating the environment as an operational com-
ponent that must be integrated in all operational 
decisions rather than as an independent external 
constraint (Gavronski et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
non-economic incentives can arise, which may 
explain the lack of importance of farm struc-
tural factors. Studies by Lowe et al. (1997) and 
Ward et al. (1998) address the important dis-
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tinction in attitudinal norms that divide farm-
ers into more radical, proactive environmental 
managers, and more traditionalists with respect 
to their perceived environmental responsibili-
ties. The more proactive farmers exhibit a sense 
of responsibility and a need for precautionary 
avoidance of environmental harm, while tradi-
tionalists are more accepting of environmental 
harm and tend to see it as an inevitable result of 
agricultural production.
Thirdly, CP is an information-based innovation 
and, therefore, the availability of information is 
likely to be crucial in the diffusion process. In 
Chile, however, the technical and economic data 
required by farmers to make informed decisions 
has not been developed in great detail.
Finally, the adoption of CP programs at the farm 
level is likely to be policy induced. The knowl-
edge of policy regulations was a signifi cant vari-
able in our model even though few farmers were 
aware of them. Recent literature on technologi-
cal change and the environment agrees that envi-
ronmental regulation is likely to stimulate inno-
vation and adoption of technology, which would 
facilitate environmental compliance (Khanna, 
2001; Kerr and Newell, 2003). Furthermore, 
regulated entities are more likely to put up with 
regulation when they believe it is appropriate, 
fair, equitable in implementation, effi cient, rel-
evant and necessary (Winter and May, 2001). 
For a representative sample of medium and large 
size dairy farms of southern Chile in 2005, we 
can validate some hypotheses proposed in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on technol-
ogy adoption. Age and education increase the 
probability of a farmer being a user of cleaner 
production practices. Conversely, the years of 
experience as a dairy farmer did not infl uence 
such decisions. There is no evidence to support 
any signifi cant effect of farm structure variables 
(i.e., output per cow) in the decision of adoption. 
It is possible then, that non-economic factors 
can infl uence farmers’ choices.  
The type of manufacturer that the farmers sell 
their milk to had a signifi cant effect on the 
decision of using CP practices. Finally, aware-
ness of environmental regulations affecting 
dairy farming also enhanced adoption, a result 
that is plausible since fi rms faced with pres-
sures or incentives resulting from environmen-
tal policies may be more committed to better 
environmental performance in order to stay 
competitive. 
The probability model estimated in this study 
provides valuable information about the vari-
ables that could be infl uencing the fi rst-stage 
adoption of CP practices for this sample of dairy 
farmers. The model’s results contribute to un-
derstanding the motivations and attributes that 
lead farmers to address pollution and potential 
environmental harm, which is relevant for judg-
ing the promise and limitations of a CP strategy 
as a voluntary approach to environmental regu-
lation. 
We expect these results to provide policy mak-
ers and regulatory agencies with useful infor-
mation to further encourage CP adoption among 
dairy farmers. This is particularly relevant in a 
scenario where agriculture will undoubtedly 
come under increasing scrutiny with regards to 
its environmental impacts. Further regulation 
is inevitable unless it can be demonstrated that 
farmers, as main examples of land stewards, are 
already behaving in environmentally respon-
sible ways.  
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Resumen
L. Nahuelhual, M.A. Engler, B. Carrillo, V. Moreira y I. Castro. 2009. Adopción de prácticas 
de producción limpia en predios lecheros del sur de Chile. Cien. Inv. Agr. 36(1):97-106. 
La creciente preocupación por los costos ambientales generados por la producción lechera, se 
ha traducido en un mayor uso de prácticas que disminuyan la generación de externalidades 
negativas. Sin embargo, existe escasa evidencia empírica en relación con los factores que 
determinan el nivel de adopción de tales prácticas en el caso de predios lecheros. En este 
estudio se estimó un modelo de probabilidad (logit) para explicar la adopción de prácticas de 
producción limpia (PL) intensivas en capital, para una muestra de 100 explotaciones lecheras 
de mediano y gran tamaño del sur de Chile. En Chile, los enfoques voluntarios para el control 
de la contaminación en la agricultura, como es el caso de la PL, son relativamente recientes y 
su difusión ha sido lenta y desigual entre los agricultores. Para el caso de esta muestra, sólo el 
43% de los agricultores utilizaba prácticas de PL en el momento de la entrevista. Los resultados 
indican que la probabilidad de adopción presenta una correlación positiva con la educación 
del agricultor y la edad, el conocimiento de las normativas ambientales, el tipo de comprador 
de leche, y el uso de prácticas complementarias de PL basadas en manejo. Por el contrario, las 
variables relacionadas con la estructura predial no fueron estadísticamente signifi cativas, lo que 
sugiere que la adopción de prácticas de PL puede responder a motivaciones no económicas. 
Palabras clave: Contaminación agropecuaria, gestión ambiental, innovación, manejo de 
lecherías, tecnológica, sector lácteo chileno.
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